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THE FDIC'S FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
POWER UNDER THE CRIME CONTROL ACT
OF 1990: BANK INSOLVENCY LAW AND THE
POLITICS OF THE IRON TRIANGLE
Edward J. Janger"
An "iron triangle" forms when a regulated industry "captures" t
both its regulating agency and that agency's congressional oversight
committee. Concern about this phenomenon has given rise to the sug-
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1. See infra text accompanying note 7.
2. MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL QUnRK, THE PonTIcs OF DEREGULATION 12 (1985). The
metaphor of the iron triangle has been applied in a wide variety of contexts. In the direct ex-
penditure context, it has been suggested by Gordon Adams to describe the dynamics of defense
contracting. GORDON ADAmS, THE IRON TRIANGLE 15 (1981) ("A powerful flow of people and
money moves between the defense contractors, the Executive Branch (DoD and NASA). and
Congress, creating an 'iron triangle' on defense policy and procurement that excludes outsiders
and alternative perspectives."). The existence of iron triangles has been used as an argument for
term limits. William Kristol, Term Limitations: Breaking up the Iron Triangle, 16 HARV. JL. &
PUB. POL'Y. 95 (1993). Edward Zelinsky has argued that, because tax writing committees am
less subject to development of iron triangles than direct expenditure committees, tax subsidies
may be preferable to direct expenditures as a mechanism for enacting distributive policy choices.
Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense
of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE LJ. 1165 (1993). Man= Olson has even
offered the iron triangle as an explanation of the "stagflation" that occurred during the 1970s.
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 41-7, 61-5 (1982) ("(D]istributional coali-
tions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in
response to changing conditions and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth."). See also
RANDALL B. RIPLEY AND GRACE A. FRANKuN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC
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gestion by proponents of regulatory reform that destabilizing iron trian-
gles--either by limiting the influence of the regulated industry3 or by
enacting congressional term limits4 -will remedy the problem.
This article tests this assertion that smashing iron triangles5 will
improve the quality of regulation by examining the FDIC's fraudulent
conveyance power under the Crime Control Act of 1990,6 a statute en-
acted in the wake of the collapse of the iron triangle in the financial
services industry, and concludes that the proposed cure may be worse
than the disease; weakened and collapsed iron triangles may present an
even greater risk of political process failure and substantive mistake
than the functioning triangles they replace.
The Problem:
The metaphor of the iron triangle arose as an explanation for the
perceived pervasiveness and persistence of agency capture in certain
regulatory contexts. Capture occurs when a regulated industry gains
control of the agency that is supposed to be providing regulatory su-
pervision.7 Capture of the executive agency alone is not necessarily
fatal to the regulatory enterprise, because the relevant congressional
committee may still supervise the agency. When an iron triangle forms,
POLICY (4th ed. 1987).
3. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALDMAN, WHO ROBBED AMERICA (1990).
4. See Kristol, supra note 4; Einer R. Elhauge, Term Limits: Voters Aren't Schizophrenic,
WALL ST. J., March 14, 1995, at A14. Others go even further, arguing that the regulatory en-
terprise itself ought to be scrapped, and the regulatory agencies abolished. DENNIS C. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE 1I 245 (1989) ("[Ihe best and simplest way to avoid the rent seeking problem
is to avoid establishing the institutions that create rents, that is, the regulations and regulatory
agencies that lead to rent seeking."). While this latter position has an attractive simplicity, as a
practical matter, administrative agencies are likely to be with us for the foreseeable future. This
article therefore focuses on proposals applying to the other two legs of the triangle.
5. See Kristol, supra note 2.
6. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990) (codified as
amended, in pertinent part, at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(17)-(19) (1994)). The FDIC's fraudulent
conveyance power is contained in Title XXV of the Crime Control Act which is also known as
the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990.
7. Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries: Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of
the House Judiciary Comm. on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries, 84th Cong. 2d
Sess., pt. 1, vol. 1, at 61-62 (1956) (testimony of Marver S. Bernstein, Associate Professor of
Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.) ("In the long run, a commission is forced to
come to terms with the regulated groups as a condition of its survival . . . . In their mature
stage, their concept of the public interest is hardly distinguishable from the view of the domi-
nant regulated interests."); George W. Hilton, The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions,
62 AM. ECON. REv. 47 (1972); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SERVICE 3 (1971) ("[R]egulation is acquired by the industry and is designed
and operated primarily for its benefit.").
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Regulating Agency ---- Regulated Industry
When such a triangle forms, the regulated industry gains control of
the content of regulation and may turn that regulation to its own private
ends. Political scientists have identified this phenomenon of triangular
capture by a number of different names, including "policy whirlpool,"'
"subgovemment," and "subsystem."'" The common characteristic is
that a triangular alliance, consisting of congressional committees and
subcommittees, administrative agencies, and the regulated industry or
benefitted group, forms to influence a specific public policy." Once
such triangular alliances form, they are perceived to be quite stable."
8. ERNEST S. GR mrm, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE (3d ed. 1961).
9. DOUGLASS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON (1964).
10. L LmER FRm AN, TH1E POLICAL PROCESS (rev. ed. 1965).
11. DANIEL McCoo., COMMAND OF ThE WATERS 5 (1987) CT]hese tripartite coalitions
influence the allocation of government goods and services in such a way that the congressional
committee members get credit for 'bringing home the bacon' to t constituents, the admin-
istrative agencies expand their budgets, personnel, and turf, and the interest groups get what
they want from government."). See DERTHICK & QUIRK supra note 2, at 12 (Th ge=ral view
was that a triumvirate (an 'iron triangle') of regulators, regulated industries and key members of
Congress, influenced by campaign contributions from the regulated industries constituted an insu-
perable barrier to any reform that was contrary to industry interests.").
12. Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, The Deregulatory Snowball: Explaining Deregu-
lation in the Financial Industry, 50 J. Pol. 3, 4 (1988).
A variety of political arguments have also been advanced to account for the stability
and extension of regulation .... Often stressed for example, is the strength of rela-
tionships among regulatory agencies, congressional committees and the regulated inter-
ests .... The regulated interests benefit from policies which maintain profitability.
The price they pay is campaign support for legislators on the committees supervising
the agencies. Civil servants of the regulatory agencies benefit from civil service pro-
tected jobs, and the appointed commissioners have the prospect of future employment
with the regulated interests.
Id. See Timothy B. Clark, The President Takes on the "Iron Triangles" and So Far Holds His
Own, 13 NAT'L J. 516 (1981) ("It has become a truism in the past decade that any change in
19951
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As James Q. Wilson has put it:
When a program supplies particular benefits to an existing or
newly-created interest, public or private, it creates a set of po-
litical relationships that make exceptionally difficult further
alteration of that program by coalitions of the majority. What
was created in the name of the common good is sustained in
the name of the particular interest. Bureaucratic clientelism
becomes self-perpetuating, in the absence of some crisis or
scandal, because a single interest group to which the program
matters greatly is highly motivated and well situated to ward off
the criticisms of other groups that have a broad but weak inter-
est in the policy.'"
Thus, according to Wilson and others, once an iron triangle is in place,
regulation is likely to diverge from the public interest and regulatory
reform will be very difficult to achieve.
The Destabilizing Solutions:
Proponents of regulatory reform and proponents of deregulation
have made a number of proposals to deal with the bureaucratic inertia
created by the iron triangle. Most of these proposals are designed to
disrupt the functioning of one or another leg of the triangle. One such
approach seeks to reduce the influence of the regulated industry on the
legislative and regulatory processes through restrictions on lobbying and
implementation of certain types of campaign finance reform.'4 Another
government programs is hard to achieve because of the combined opposition of middle-level
bureaucrats, members of highly specialized congressional panels and lobbyists for the beneficia-
ries of government programs."). See also MARVER H. BERNSTEN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY
IDENDENT COMMNISSION (1955); THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LBERALISM (1969); GRANT
McCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); DAVID TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCFss (1951); Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Com-
mission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE LJ. 467 (1952).
13. James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, in THE AMERICAN COMMON-
WEALTH 93-94 (Nathan Glazer & Irving Kristol eds., 1976).
14. WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 155 ("[There is only one surefire way to get the tainted
special-interest money out of politics: replace it with voluntary public funds."). Waldman empha-
sizes the power of industry campaign contributions and lobbying efforts on key committee mem-
bers. For some current theories of campaign finance reform see Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the
Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13 AM. PROSPECt 71 (Spring 1993); Edward
B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principal of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1204 (1994); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994);
Fred Werthehner & Susan W. Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the
[Vol. 28:67
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related approach, which has gained much recent currency, seeks to
reduce the influence of special interests by enacting congressional term
limits. Term limits, it is argued, will eliminate the long term entrenched
relationships between members of Congress and the regulated industry
that result from long legislative tenure.'
5
Testing the Destabilizing Solutions-A Case Study:
This article uses a case study approach to evaluate these proposed
destabilizing solutions. Congress enacted the FDIC's fraudulent convey-
ance power as part of the Crime Control Act of 1990, in response to
the failure of bank deregulation. This statute can therefore be viewed as
a statute enacted in the wake of the collapse of an iron triangle, and
offers an opportunity to test the effect of an iron triangle's collapse on
the content of regulation.
The case study reveals that the collapse of the iron triangle in the
financial services industry led to the exclusion of the banking lobby
from the negotiations over the Crime Control Act generally, and the
FDIC's fraudulent conveyance power in particular. The result is a statu-
tory provision ihat is ill-conceived, but ill-conceived in an interesting
way. The fraudulent conveyance provisions' weaknesses bear the ear-
marks of unchecked pursuit of institutional interests by Congress and
the FDIC. More importantly, the legislative history of the statute pro-
vides strong evidence that the statute's shortcomings would have been
avoided had the participation of affected groups, including banks and
thrifts, been encouraged.
Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L REV. 1126 (1994). These articles focus on tht related
evils of corruption and inequality. To the extent that these proposals seek to limit corruption, by
limiting the quid pro quo of campaign contributions for votes, these efforts are to the good. To
the extent that they seek to reduce the success of incumbents, or to limit the substantive partic-
ipation of interested groups, this article seeks to point out that the effort may have certain unin-
tended consequences. See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Re-
form, 94 COLUNM. L. REV. 1369, 1378-79 (1994) ("[Slome positions on certain issues may be
less well represented in the public debate than their merits warrant; intemediary organizations,
by speaking forcefully for these interests, might improve the quality of public deliberation over
what would prevail if intermediaries were discouraged."); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality
and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L REV. 1390, 1410 (1994) (CPAC limits will in
some circumstances diminish the power of minority candidates. ... A ban on PACs may ...
diminish the influence of labor unions without materially affecting corporate PACs.").
15. Kristol, supra note 2; Elhauge, supra note 4.
1995]
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Some Problems with the Solutions:
This analysis suggests that there are peculiar risks associated with
legislating in the wake of the collapse of an iron triangle. An apprecia-
tion of these risks in turn casts doubt on the wisdom of the
destabilizing solutions. A functioning iron triangle combines two fail-
ures of the political process: first, it is a form of the principal/agent
problem, 6 in that the principal (the chief executive, Congress, or the
electorate) 7 is unable to ensure that the agent (the agency) acts in ac-
cordance with its instructions (regulates in the public interest); and
second, it is a failure of pluralism, in that inadequate participation by
affected groups allows the regulated industry to dominate the regulatory
process. The destabilizing solutions do not eliminate the principal/agent
problem, while they exacerbate the failure of pluralism by silencing an
affected group. In the case of the FDIC's fraudulent conveyance power,
the silencing of the regulated industry allowed the FDIC and Congress
to adopt a statute that was driven by their own particular institutional
interests rather than the public interest. More importantly, however,
silencing the regulated industry resulted in a failure of quality con-
trol--Congress adopted a statute that didn't work. For these reasons, to
the extent that advocates of term limits and campaign finance reform
seek to exclude the regulated industry from the regulatory process, their
prescriptions may not improve the content of regulation and are likely,
in important respects, to make it worse.
This article is divided into two sections. Section I analyzes the
FDIC's power to avoid fraudulent conveyances under the Crime Control
Act of 1990 and concludes that the inclusion of a superpriority for the
FDIC is likely to reduce both the number of fraudulent conveyances
16. Matthew D. McCubbins et a]., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 433-34 (1989) (citing
Bengt Holimstrom, Moral Hazard & Observability, 10 BELL J. ECoN. 74 (1979) (moral hazard
and imperfect information in principal-agent relations)); Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J.
POL. Sc!. 165 (1984).
17. Compare Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in The Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 369 (1989) with Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Com.
ments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 438 (1989) ('[Professor Rubin] proceeds as if there
were only one such [principal/agent] problem-that between Congress and its agent, the agency.
In fact, there are two principal/agent problems immediately at work, and others in the wings.
Congress is also an agent of the citizens; it is neither our only agent, nor our only agent in
what could be called a principal/agent relationship with the agencies."). For the purposes of the
argument made in this article it does not matter whether the chief executive, Congress, or the
electorate is viewed as the principal. Once an iron triangle forms, the principal, however char-
acterized, loses control of the agency.
[Vol. 28:67/
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avoided and the amount received by the FDIC, thereby serving neither
the articulated nor the unarticulated goals of Congress. Section II is in
turn divided into four parts. The first part develops the concept of the
iron triangle. The second part shows (1) that the bank regulatory
scheme that existed through the mid 1970s and the deregulation that
occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s were each, to a large extent,
the product of an iron triangle, and (2) that the Crime Control Act of
1990 is an example of legislation enacted after the collapse of that iron
triangle. The third part demonstrates that the failings of the FDIC's
superpriority are directly traceable to the exclusion of the regulated
industry from the drafting process. The fourth part explains why this
example suggests that the destabilizing solutions described above may
not provide an effective solution to the problem of iron triangles. Final-
ly, this article very briefly seeks to derive some lessons for legislators
who seek to legislate after an iron triangle has collapsed.
I. THE FDIC's FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE POWER-AN ANALYSIS
When Congress enacted the Crime Control Act of 1990, the savings
and loan industry was in disarray. The Senate Ethics Committee's hear-
ings on the failure of Lincoln Savings were in full swing, and the
depth of the crisis in the financial industry as a whole had only recent-
ly become apparent to the electorate. The Crime Control Act was a
product of this political climate. Congress stated its purpose clearly in
the statute's legislative history-to recover assets from the Charles
Keatings of the world." As part of this effort to clean up the S&L
mess, Congress conferred on the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver, an
enhanced power to avoid intentional fraudulent conveyances by affiliates
of, or borrowers from, a failed institution made within five years of the
commencement of the receivership.19 However, because the legislative
18. The House Report states:
Title XI responds £o the public outcry to bring to justice those who defrauded the
savings and loan industry by providing Federal regulating agencies, Federal prosecu-
tors, and law enforcement agencies with additional tools to combat fraud and abuse
affecting financial institutions.
H.R. REP. No. 101-681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 171 (1990) (emphasis added). Indeed,
on November 29, 1990, the day the statute was enacted, the New York Times ran an editorial
characterizing the defense offered by the so-called "Keating Five" as "embarrassing." How to
Judge the Keating Five, N.Y. TMS, Nov. 29, 1990 at A28.
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(A) provides:
The Corporation, as conservator or receiver for any insured depository institution, and
any conservator appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency or the Director of the
19951
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drafters did not consider the interaction between bank insolvency law
and bankruptcy law, the statute, as enacted, does not serve this goal.
A. The FDIC's Power to Avoid Fraudulent Conveyances Under 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)
The FDIC's power to avoid fraudulent conveyances comes into play
in the following familiar circumstance: Theodore ("The") Donald, a real
estate developer who has previously borrowed from Failed Bank, recog-
nizes that his real estate portfolio is grossly overvalued and that he is
insolvent. Concerned that his many other creditors will shortly arrive at
Office of Thrift Supervision may avoid a transfer of any interest of an institution-
affiliated party, or any person who the Corporation or conservator determines is a
debtor of the institution, in property, or any obligation incurred by such party or
person, that was made within 5 years of the date on which the Corporation or con-
servator was appointed conservator or receiver if such party or person voluntarily or
involuntarily made such transfer or incurred such liability with the intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud the insured depository institution, the Corporation or other conserva-
tor, or any other appropriate Federal banking agency.
The FDIC has relied on this section in actions to avoid, and investigations into, fraudulent
conveyances by bank affiliated parties. See In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127 (2d Cir. 1995) (quash-
ing administrative subpoenas of family members of officers and directors of Landmark Bank of
Hartford); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding sub-
poena duces tecum against directors and officers of Trustbank Savings, F.S.B.); Linde, Thomson,
Langworth, Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1512-18 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (upholding administrative subpoena against former law firm of failed bank); Resolu-
tion Trust Corp. v. Cruce, 972 F.2d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding asset freeze against
former officers and directors of Peoples Heritage Savings); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Burke, 869
F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1994) (enforcing administrative subpoenas against former officers and
directors of Home Savings Bank); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Heiserman, 839 F. Supp.
1457 (D. Colo. 1993) (suit against wife of director, as transferee of fraudulent transfer by direc-
tor); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Heiserman, 151 F.R.D. 367 (D. Colo. 1993) (fraudulent convey-
ance action against officers and directors of failed savings and loan); Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Fleischer, 826 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Kan. 1993) (fraudulent conveyance action against former offi-
cers and directors of failed bank); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Spagnoli, 811 F. Supp. 1005
(D.NJ. 1993) (fraudulent conveyance action against embezzler employee of failed bank); Resolu-
tion Trust Corp. v. Feffer, 793 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1992) (fraudulent conveyance action against
former officers and directors of Sun State Bank). The FDIC has also brought actions under
this section against mere borrowers of a failed bank. See FDIC v. Elio, 39 F.3d 1239, 1245
(1st Cir. 1994) (borrowers from Boston Trade Bank); FDIC v. Anchor Properties, 13 F.3d 27,
31 (1st Cir. 1994) (setting aside fraudulent conveyance by borrower from Bank of New Eng-
land); In re Pasquareiello, 16 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1994) (borrowers from North Jersey Federal
Savings and Loan); In re Colonial Realty Corp., 980 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding ac-
tion against bankrupt borrowers from failed bank barred by automatic stay); FDIC v. Yemelos,
778 F. Supp. 329 (D. La. 1991) (fraudulent conveyance action against borrowers from Bossier
Bank and Trust Co.); FDIC v. Cafritz, 762 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 (D.D.C. 1991) (freezing assets
of Conrad and Peggy Cooper Cafritz).
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the same conclusion, and to guard against the impending attack of ner-
vous bankers, Donald conveys his modest cottage in the Hamptons to




Bank 2 - ------ Donald
Failed Bank
I conveyance
Cottage - - ------ Marla
Donald's conveyance to Maria is subject to challenge under 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(A), enacted as part of the Crime Control Act, be-
cause Donald is a borrower from Failed Bank, and because the transfer
was intended to hinder, delay, and possibly defraud his creditors (in-
cluding Failed Bank). The cottage, or its value, is recoverable from
Marla pursuant to § 1821(d)(17)(B). 2? ' If Maria gave value (in the
form of cancellation of debt, for example) in return for the conveyance,
and was unaware of her husband's financial condition at the time, she
may have a defense pursuant to § 1821(d)(17)(C). 2
20. These facts are similar, but not identical, to those at issue in Coafriz 762 F. Supp. at
1503, involving Washington D.C. real estate magnate Conrad Caffitz and his wife Peggy Cooper
Cafritz.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(B) provides:
To the extent a transfer is avoided under subparagraph (A), the Corporation or any
conservator described in such subparagraph may recover, for the benefit of the in-
sured depository institution, the property transferred, or, if a court so orders, the value
of such property (at the time of such transfer) from-
(i) the initial transferee of such transfer or the institution-affiliated party or
person for whose benefit such transfer was made; or
(ii) any immediate or mediate transferee of any such initial transferee.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(C) provides:
The Corporation or any conservator described in subparagraph (A) may not recover
under subparagraph (B) from-
(i) any transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a
present or antecedent debt, in good faith; or
(ii) any immediate or mediate good faith transferce of such transferee.
In the Cafritz case, Mr's. Cafritz argued that her husband had conveyed certain assets to her in
return for cancellation of certain existing and outstanding intrafamilial debts. However, Judge
Richey found it unlikely that Mrs. Cafritz had not had notice of her husband's financial condi-




So far, the FDIC's power to avoid fraudulent conveyances under
the Crime Control Act is non-controversial. Indeed, it is a power that is
conferred by state law upon any of Donald's creditors,' and, should
he go bankrupt, upon his trustee by 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b)24 and
548(a)(1). s Except for the five year statute of limitations,26 this pow-
er would be available to the FDIC without specific authorization be-
cause, under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A), a provision which predates the
Crime Control Act, the FDIC succeeds to the rights of Failed Bank as
a creditor under state law.27
Congress was not content, however, to enact a statute that merely
mirrored existing fraudulent conveyance law. To do so would have been
redundant.' Congress also conferred on the FDIC the power to seek
an order freezing the assets of a party against whom it was asserting a
23. Every state has enacted some form of law invalidating intentional fraudulent conveyances.
Such statutes take as their common ancestor the Statute of 13 Elizabeth which provides:
[C]ovinous and fraudulent feoffments, gifts, grants, alienations, conveyances, bonds,
suits, judgments and executions, as well of lands and of tenements as of goods and
chattels, . .. devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion or guile, to the
end, purpose and intent, to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others ... shall be
utterly void, frustrate and of no effect.
13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570). The Statute of 13 Elizabeth has been replaced in about half of the states
by section 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA). DAVID G. EPSTEIN & STEVE
H. NiCKLEs, DEBT: BANKRUPTCY, ARTICLE 9 AND RELATED LAws: MODERN CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 47-50 (1994). Recently, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promul-
gated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) as a successor to the UFCA. Section 4 of
the UFTA is a direct descendant of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. Id. at 49.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994) provides: "The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under appli-
cable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994) provides:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one
year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involun-
tarily -
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or
after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
indebted ....
26. The statute of limitations for avoiding fraudulent conveyances varies widely under state
law. Some jurisdictions have limitations periods as short as 3 years. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-59-209 (Michie Supp. 1993). Others states extend the limitations period to as many as six
years. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 213(8) (McKinney 1990).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) ("The Corporation shall, as conservator or receiver, and by
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claim, 9 and to obtain such relief without making the usual showing of
irreparable harm." This allows the FDIC to freeze Donald's assets
without making a showing that he is presently secreting assets. Even
this injunction power, however, is relatively noncontroversial and argu-
ably would have been available in the absence of specific statutory
authorization.3'
"B. The FDIC's Superpriority Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(D)
The principal innovation contained in the Crime Control Act is
contained in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(D), which renders the FDIC's
avoidance power "superior" to the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy.
That section provides, "The rights under this paragraph of the Corpora-
tion and any conservator described in subparagraph (A) shall be su-
perior to any rights of a trustee or any other party (other than a party
which is a Federal Agency) under Title 11."32 Section 1821(d)(17)(D)
thus places the FDIC at the front of the bankruptcy queue 3 By corn-
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(18); see FDIC v. Cafritz, 762 F. Supp. 1503. 1505 (D.D.C. 1991).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(19); see CaflNtz, 762 F. Supp. at 1505.
31. Even the relaxation of the irreparable harm requirement mirrors existing case law, which
holds that a showing that an important federal policy has been violated vitiates the need for the
separate showing of irreparable harm usually required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.
John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L REV. 525 (1978); see
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); U.S. v. Schmitt, 734 F. Supp. 1035. 1048 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) ("irreparable harm is presumed when the government seeks a preliminary injunction pur-
suant to a statute which expressly authorizes entry of an injunction upon a showing of a viola-
tion of law by the Government"); EEOC v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 587 F. Supp. 636, 690
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (irreparable harm requirement relaxed in Title VII cases brought by the
EEOC). See also SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 102, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1972)
(asset freeze under the securities laws). One court has limited the scope of this exception, hold-
iag that an asset freeze under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(18) is not available in the absence of a
showing of likelihood of success of a claim under §1821(d)(17). or a showing that the asset is
likely to be dissipated-
[In a case brought under §1821(d)(17), the issue is necessarily addressed in the
traditional requirement of showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. If
the underlying lawsuit does not allege fraudulent activity ... a petition for prelimi-
nary injunction must show some potential injury evidenced by a clear nexus between
past fraudulent conduct and the property for which restraint is sought ....
FDIC v. Floyd, 827 F. Supp. 409, 414 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(D) (emphasis added).
33. In In re Colonial Realty Corp., 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992). the court stated'
[A]lthough § 1821(d)(17)[D] is framed in terms of the FDIC having "rights" that are
"superior" to those of a Title 11 trustee or any other party, the exception for federal
agencies indicates that a preferential claim, rather than any exemption from estab-
lished statutory procedures, is at the heart of the FDIC's enhanced "rights." Thus
drawing upon Whiting Pools [, 462 U.S. 198 (1983)), the bankruptcy court concluded
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parison to the other powers contained in § 1821(d)(17)-(19), the effect
of the plain language of this provision is sweeping. If Donald goes
bankrupt, the FDIC, as receiver for Failed Bank, has the power to
recover the fraudulently conveyed family cottage ahead of all of
Donald's other creditors, including Donald's bankruptcy trustee.
This "priority" for the FDIC is no ordinary bankruptcy priority. Its
effects are quite extraordinary and arguably unprecedented. While § 507
of the Bankruptcy Code contains a number of provisions which similar-
ly reflect a legislative intention to benefit one class of creditors at the
expense of others,34 and §§ 1113 and 1114 may even elevate certain
prepetition claims to administrative priority status,35 the effect of §
in this case that the "word 'superior' in §1821(d)(17)(D) means 'prior in right."'
Pertinent legislative history supports this view.
Id. at 134. See In re Still, 963 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating in dicta that the "FDIC's
right to pursue fraudulent transfers from its debtors is 'superior to any rights of a trustee or
any other party (other than any party which is a federal agency) under the [Bankruptcy
Code]"); H.R. REP. No. 101-681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 181 (1990) ("Paragraph
(17(D)] gives the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation superior rights to the trustee or any
other party (other than a federal agency) in bankruptcy with respect to the property trans-
ferred.'.
34. Some of these priorities are tightly linked to the Bankruptcy Code's goal of encouraging
reorganization and orderly distribution of assets. Section 507(a)(1)'s priority for administrative
expenses of the estate, and § 507(a)(2)'s priority for involuntary gap creditors fall into this
category. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1)-(a)(2) (1994). Other of these priorities are intended to assist
groups who are particularly likely to be harmed by bankruptcy. The claims of employees of the
debtor under §§ 507(a)(3) and 507(a)(4) appear to fall into this category. 11 U.S.C. §§
507(a)(3)-(a)(4). Finally, some of these priorities, such as the priorities for claims of farmers and
fishermen under § 507(a)(5), appear to be transfers to interest groups who were particularly suc-
cessful in the legislative process. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5).
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1114 (1994). Under § 1114, retiree medical benefits which accrued
prepetition, but which either have not been paid as of the petition date, or which become pay-
able after the petition date are accorded administrative priority status. In re GF Corp., 115 B.R.
579 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990). Courts are divided over whether the same is true under 11
U.S.C. § 1113 for wages, vacation and sick pay accrued prepetition under a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Compare In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 955, 957 (3d Cir. 1992)
("[Severance pay claims based on length of service,] like vacation pay claims, only have admin-
istrative priority to the extent that they are based on services provided to the bankruptcy estate
post-petition"); In re Ohio Corrugating, 115 B.R. 572, 575 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding
that wages, severance pay and vacation benefits are only accorded priority if it can be shown
that they were earned post-petition); and In re Murray Industries, 110 B.R. 585, 587 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990), vacated as moot, 140 B.R. 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that vacation
pay claims vesting before petition, the payment of which is triggered by post-petition events, are
considered pre-petition claims and are not afforded priority status) with In re Canton Castings,
Inc., 103 B.R. 874, 875 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that vacation benefits earned pre-
petition may be paid to hourly employees pursuant to collective bargaining agreement). See
Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy Code § 1114: Congress' Empty Response to the Retiree Plight, 67
Am. BANKR. LJ. 17 (1993); Janell M. Kurtz et al., Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agree-
THE COLLAPSE OF AN IRON TRIANGLE
1821(d)(17)(D) is at once broader and more uncertain than the priorities
and superpriorities created within the Bankruptcy Code. Because the
FDIC's rights under § 1821(d)(17)(D) are superior even to those of the
bankruptcy trustee, the FDIC appears to receive what might be called a
"super-duper" priority. It is this super-duper priority which causes sub-
stantial mischief.
C. Redistributive Effect of § 1821(d)(17)(D)
Viewed in isolation, the net effect of the FDIC's superpriority
might appear to be positive: it enhances the FDIC's incentive to recover
assets which can be used to replenish the insurance fund. However, this
enhanced power has certain costs. In most cases, the FDIC will not be
the only entity with the right to avoid a challenged fraudulent convey-
ance. For example, Donald's transfer of his house to Maria for no
consideration is fraudulent as to all of his creditors, not just the
FDIC.37 As noted above, the transfer violates equally a creditor's
ments in Bankruptcy: A Review, Update and Guide for Debtors. 96 Com. LJ. 31 (1991);
Mitchell Rait, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Under Section 1113 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code: The Second Circuit Enters the Arena, 63 AM. BANKuL LJ. 355 (1989).
36. The Colonial Realty court called the FDIC's claim a "preferential claim" that would be
"prior in right." 980 F.2d at 134. What this means is not clear by any means. Th1 FDIC's
claim does not fit within the definition of a secured claim under 11 U.S.C. § 506. in that it is
not secured by a "lien on property" or "setoff." Neither does it fit within the definition of any
of the priority claims detailed in 11 US.C. § 507. Indeed, it is not even clear that the property
subject to the FDIC's priority becomes property of the estate. To the extent that the trustee has
any rights, in property, they are granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541, which defines property of
the estate. The bankruptcy estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." Id. at 130. Courts are divided over
whether fraudulently transferred property is property of the estate. Compare In re Si. Acquisi-
tions, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that creditor's action belonged to
debtor and was property of the estate to which an automatic stay applied) and In re
MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that debtor who fraudu-
lently transferred property is considered to have continuing legal interest in it. therefore it is
property of the estate and automatic stay is applicable); with In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303,
305-06 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that fraudulently transferred property is not to be con-
sidered property of the estate until it is recovered). Cf. In re Sherk, 918 F.2d 1170, 1175-77
(5th Cir. 1990) ("Once either the trustee or the debtor has avoided the transfer, the [fraudulently
transferred] property becomes property of the estate and the debtor may then exempt it if he
meets the statutory requirements."). The Colonial Realty court chose to follow Saunders and
held that the property conveyed is not property of the estate. Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 131.
37. Because the FDIC's avoidance power reaches conveyances that occurred as many as five
years before the insolvency of Failed Bank, in those states where the limitations period for
fraudulent conveyances is less than five years, the FDIC may in fact be alone in its power to
avoid the transaction. This distinction, however, is likely to be of little prdctical importance.
Tolling doctrines, applicable in many states, see, e.g., Rio v. Edward Hospital, 472 N.E.2d 421
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rights under state fraudulent conveyance law and the FDIC's rights
under the Crime Control Act. In bankruptcy, Donald's trustee would
have the power to avoid the conveyance for the benefit of all of his
creditors under either 11 U.S.C. § 544 or, if the transfer occurred with-
in a year of bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). The benefit to the
FDIC comes, therefore, at the expense of Donald's other creditors. Be-
cause of the FDIC's superpriority, and because by happenstance Donald
borrowed from Failed Bank, the FDIC gets all of the money, and his
other creditors receive nothing.
Thus, with the exception of the FDIC's superpriority, 12 U.S.C. §§
1821(d) (17)-(19) confer upon the FDIC powers it already has, and, the
primary effect of that superpriority is likely to be redistribution of
fraudulent conveyance recoveries, rather than furtherance of the stated
legislative goal of increasing the number of fraudulent conveyances
avoided. In other words, while sold as a statute which would increase
the likelihood that secreted funds would be recovered for the benefit of
taxpayers, the principal effect of the fraudulent conveyance provisions
of the Crime Control Act, and in particular § 1821(d)(17)(D), will be to
redistribute funds recovered from private creditors of the debtor to the
federal bank insurance fund. Indeed, for the reasons discussed below,
the effect of this redistribution will likely be to reduce rather than to
increase the degree to which fraudulent conveyance laws are enforced,
and may even be to reduce the dollar amount recovered by the bank
insurance fund itself.
D. Elimination of the Trustee's Incentive to Bring Avoidance Actions
While redistribution may have been Congress' actual (if unarticu-
lated) goal, this redistribution does nothing to punish fraud, and it has
other consequences that Congress does not appear to have anticipated.
In most bankruptcies, it is the trustee or the creditors' committee of the
debtor that analyzes the affairs of the debtor, identifies and seeks to
avoid preferential and fraudulent transfers, and recovers those transfers
for all of the creditors of the estate (including the FDIC). Indeed, once
a debtor has filed for bankruptcy, it is virtually impossible for an indi-
(IM. 1984) (applying discovery rule under Illinois law); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/13-215
(Smith-Hurd 1992) (formerly ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-215) (tolling of statute of limi-
tations where cause of action is fraudulently concealed), and problems of proof associated with
proving fraud more than five years in the past are likely to result in this class of cases being
relatively small.
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vidual creditor to pursue a fraudulent conveyance claim on its own
behalf.38 The FDIC's superpriority, however, eliminates any incentive
for the trustee or committee to pursue such actions. 9
The impact of this problem is greater than it might first appear. A
bankruptcy trustee has the power to avoid a wide variety of prepetition
transfers.' While the FDIC's superpriority extends only to intentional
38. The Bankruptcy Code provides the trustee alone (and by implication a debtor.in-posses-
sion) with standing to invoke the avoidance powers set forth in, among other provisions, §§
544, 547, and 548. See, e.g., In re V. Savino Oil & Heating Co., 91 B.R. 655. 656 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Monsour Medical Cr., 5 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980). A
creditors' committee has the implied authority to bring an avoidance action on behalf of the
estate, on approval of the bankruptcy court, if the debtor does not object, or if the tmstee abus-
es its discretion in not suing. See, e.g., In re Prime Motor Inns, Inc, 135 B.R. 917. 919
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992); Savino Oil & Heating Co., 91 B.R. at 656-577.
There are significant impediments to avoidance actions brought by parties other than the
debtor, trustee, or official committee. Four requirements must be satisfied before a party other
than the trustee may bring an avoidance action over the trustee's objection: (1) the party must
have made a demand upon the trustee to bring the action; (2) the trustee must have unjustifi-
ably refused the demand; (3) the party must have made a prima facie showing of a colorable
claim; and (4) the party must have obtained leave of the court. See, e.g., Prime Motor Inns,
135 B.R. at 919. Any action brought by a creditor or creditors' committee must be brought on
behalf of and benefit the estate. "[E]ven official committees" must demonstrate "extraordinary
circumstances" before receiving permission to bring an avoidance action over the debtor's objec-
tion. See Prime Motor Inns, 135 B.R. at 919. Noting the distinction between an official com-
mittee bringing the action and an individual creditor, Judge Cristol stated that "[ilt is the rare
case where a party in interest other than a trustee or debtor-in-possession may prosecute an
estate's causes of action, and rarer still that such party may be anyone other than a court ap-
pointed committee." ld. It is only under "extreme circumstances" that courts permit an individual
creditor to pursue avoidance actions on behalf of the estate. Id. at 920, n.4. See also In re
Feldhahn, 92 B.R. 834, 836 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988) (court must balance the competing inter-
ests and determine whether the initiation of the action would aid the reorganization effort or
impede it).
39. In addition to the redistribution and incentive effects discussed below, an additional in-
anticipated effect of this superpriority may be to reduce the creditworthiness of borrowers of
troubled banks. Where a debtor has not borrowed from a failed, or troubled bank, the creditors
can expect to have recourse to fraudulent conveyance recoveries. By contrast, creditors of a bor-
rower of a failed or troubled bank can expect to see those assets swept up by the FDIC. This
has the further effect of reducing the value of the troubled bank's assets at just the time when
it needs those assets most. Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42
DUKE LJ. 469, 548-550 (1992). Professor Swim has noted-
The possibility of insolvency is itself a reason for borrowers to seek alternative fund-
ing. Loans are unlikely to be renewed once the bank enters receivership, and loan
officers who approved the existing loan may well lose their jobs. Because borrowers
will perceive the "black hole" phenomenon, they will have reason to move their
business. The best borrowers will leave first, saddling the nearly insolvent bank with
a growing proportion of riskier loans that cannot get alternative financing. Profits on
lending will thus become difficult to achieve at just the time that the three-percent-
capital bank has few other sources of funding.
Id at 549-50.
40. The trustee may avoid preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547, constructive fraudulent con-
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frauds,4' a conveyance can be simultaneously a preference, a construc-
tive fraud, and an intentional fraud.42 Moreover, the line is frequently
difficult to draw. Preferences are easier to prove-there is no need to
establish intent or the insolvency of the debtor-but it is not difficult to
imagine the FDIC asserting that an avoided preference is also an in-
tentional fraudulent conveyance and therefore subject to the FDIC's
superpriority 3 In a bankruptcy case where the FDIC is a major credi-
tor, a creditors' committee faced with spending significant amounts of
money to recover preferences may be dissuaded by two very real pos-
sibilities: either (1) the fruits of their labor will be claimed by the
FDIC; or (2) the estate may be forced to engage in protracted and
otherwise unnecessary litigation over the basis for avoiding transactions
that are concededly avoidable.
This problem is compounded further when one recognizes that the
FDIC's superpriority primes the administrative claims of the trustee's
counsel for fees, and therefore increases the contingent risk associated
with pursuing even ordinary preferences." Indeed, it is likely that
veyances under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2), intentional fraudulent conveyances under 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(1), unperfected security interests under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a), and state law fraudulent con-
veyances under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).
41. Even if the class of winnable intentional fraud cases is relatively small, as discussed
below, the FDIC's superpriority is likely to effect a larger number of cases, where the FDIC
will assert its superpriority. Even if the effect was limited to those few winnable intentional
fraud claims, the impact on the insurance fund would be negative with regard to those cases.
42. For example, assume that the conveyance of the cottage by Donald to his wife Marla
occurred within 90 days of Donald's bankruptcy filing, ostensibly in satisfaction of a preexisting
debt. The transfer would be both a preference and an intentional fraud.
43. This is precisely what happened when the estate of Dominic Antonelli (a real estate de-
veloper in Maryland and the District of Columbia) attempted to avoid Mr. Antonelli's convey-
ance of his house to his children. The estate sought to avoid the transfer as an insider prefer-
ence, and the FDIC sought to intervene, asserting that the transfer was an intentional fraudulent
conveyance and therefore subject to the FDIC's superpriority. In re Dominic and Judith
Antonelli, Case No. 91-4-0254-PM (Bankr., D. Md.) (conversation with Rick Schifter, counsel to
the Debtors).
44. Normally, the administrative expenses of the estate, which include the trustee's fees, and
the fees of trustee's counsel, are accorded first priority. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). However, the
language of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(D) states that the rights of the FDIC are superior to the
rights of the trustee. Therefore, if the trustee avoids a preference, and then the FDIC success-
fully asserts that the preference was also an intentional fraudulent conveyance, the trustee will
not be compensated for his or her effort. If the FDIC's claim could be considered a secured
claim under 11 U.S.C. § 506, the trustee could deduct his expenses from any recovery by the
secured creditor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). Under the plain language of 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(17)(D), however, the FDIC's rights under § 1821(d)(17)(A) are superior to those of the
trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (discussed infra part L.F).
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many trustees and creditors' committees will conclude that even the
preference game is not worth the candle. 5
Thus, to the extent that it does anything, the practical effect of the
FDIC's superpriority will be to dissuade trustees and creditors' commit-
tees from pursuing preferences and fraudulent conveyances on behalf of
all of a debtor's creditors (including the FDIC). Where the FDIC's
superpriority applies, even arguably, the responsibility for identifying
and pursuing fraudulent transfers will likely fall to the FDIC and the
FDIC alone.
E. Evaluation of the FDIC as an Instrument of Enforcement
Assuming that Congress intended the redistribution described above,
there is a problem only if the FDIC is not up to the job assigned to it.
However, for two reasons - one institutional and one procedural-it is
not.
1. The Institutional Reason-Lack of Information
The FDIC is simply not the entity best situated to uncover and
prosecute fraudulent conveyance actions. It is the FDIC's institutional
job to learn about the financial affairs of banks, not the financial affairs
of borrowers or bank-affiliated parties.46
45. It might be possible for the FDIC and the estate to contract around this problem. In a
world without transaction costs and with full information, this might solve the problem. See
RIL Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). There are, however, a
number of significant obstacles to such a Coasean bargain. The nature of the FDIC's superprior-
ity and the factual context in which any such bargain must be negotiated create significant
information problems and entail significant transaction costs. First, the scope of the FDIC's
superpriority is not certain by any means. Second, since the priority only applies in cases of
intentional fraud, there is likely to be considerable uncertainty at the beginning of the case
(which is when such a bargain must be struck) over whether the FDIC's priority will apply.
Again, the Antonelli case provides an example of this dynamic in action. Although the FDIC
and the estate ultimately reached an agreement over cost-splitting, it was not until both the
FDIC and the Antonelli estate had run up significant legal fees in litigating over the scope and
applicability of the FDIC's superpriority. In re Dominic and Judith Antonelli, Case No. 91-4-
0254-PM (Bankr., D. Md.) (conversation with Rick Schifter, counsel to the Debtors).
46. The powers conferred on the FDIC by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) are directed toward allowing
the FDIC to administer (and/or liquidate) the institution, not to administer the reorganization or
liquidation of borrowers or affiliates of the bank. Sections 1821(d)2)(A)-K) are directed toward
allowing the FDIC to: (1) function as a successor to the failed institution; (2) to operate the
institution; and (3) to fulfill the functions of the institution's officers and directors.
While the FDIC is well situated to identify fraudulent conveyances of the assets of the
failed institution itself to affiliated entities, it does not know about the financial affairs of bank
1995]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
When the FDIC commences a receivership, FDIC employees im-
merse themselves in the financial affairs of the failed bank.47 In some
cases this will yield a familiarity with the financial affairs of certain of
the bank's borrowers. However, in most cases, the familiarity will ex-
tend only as far as the loan documents for the particular credit. (This is
the insight that motivates the so called "D'Oench" doctrine.)' As
such, while the FDIC may be in an excellent position to identify mal-
feasance by officers of the bank, it is rarely well positioned to identify
malfeasance by the bank's borrowers.
Trustees and creditors' committees, by contrast, are appointed for
the sole purpose of familiarizing themselves with the debtor's affairs.
They frequently have access to insiders of the debtor, and may even
have the insiders' cooperation in identifying fraudulent transfers. Yet,
the effect of the FDIC's superpriority is to rob the trustee or the credi-
tors' committee of any incentive to make use of these resources.
2. The Procedural Problem-the Automatic Stay
If Donald goes bankrupt, these institutional impediments are com-
pounded by the procedural barrier imposed by the automatic stay.49
The Second Circuit held, in In re Colonial Realty,0 that the automatic
stay bars the FDIC from acting unilaterally to recover fraudulent con-
veyances under § 1821(d)(17).s' Instead, the FDIC must either piggy-
officers and directors. Indeed, a significant number of the published cases brought against bank
affiliated parties, involve motions to quash administrative subpoenas filed by the FDIC in an ef-
fort to learn about the financial affairs of bank affiliates. In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127 (2d Cir.
1995) (quashing administrative subpoenas of family members of officers and directors of Land-
mark Bank of Hartford); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(upholding subpoena duces tecum against directors and officers of Trustbank Savings, F.S.B.);
Linde, Thomson, Langworth, Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding administrative subpoena against former law firm of failed bank);
Resolution Trust Co. v. Burke, 869 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1994) (enforcing administrative subpoe-
nas against former officers and directors of Home Savings Bank). If these affiliates are solvent,
then this effort is unnecessary. If they ultimately file for bankruptcy, it is duplicative at best.
47. See In re NBW Commercial Paper Litigation, 826 F. Supp. 1448 (D.D.C. 1992).
48. Under the rule first stated in D'Oench Duhme v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), oral
agreements between a bank and a borrower are not binding on the FDIC as receiver, should the
bank fail. The Court in D'Oench was concerned that such oral agreements might be used to
deceive bank examiners. For that reason, under the D'Oench doctrine, the FDIC is entitled to
rely on the books and records of the failed bank. This power has been codified in part at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(9) and 1823(e). For a discussion of the codification of D'Oench, see NBW
Commercial Paper Litigation, 826 F. Supp. at 1456-67.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
50. 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992).
51. In In re Colonial Realty, the FDIC initiated a lawsuit in Florida to recover assets alleged
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back on the trustee's investigation and avoidance efforts, or seek relief
from stay.52 Relief from stay will only be available, however, where
the fraudulent transaction has previously been identified, and where the
FDIC has sufficient information to explain why the transaction was an
intentional fraud, not just a constructive fraud or preferential transfer
The end result is likely to be a double-whammy. The transfers
won't be identified. Avoidance actions won't be brought, and the
Charles Keatings of the world won't have to repay their ill-gotten
gains. Indeed, even if the transfers are avoided, there is likely to be
costly litigation over whether the FDIC's superpriority applies. As a
result, the likely net effect of the superpriority will be to cause the
FDIC to recover less, not more, for the insurance fund.
to have been fraudulently conveyed by a debtor who had filed for bankruptcy in ConnecticuL
The FDIC argued that 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(17)-(19) exempted the FDIC from the operation of
the automatic bankruptcy stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. 980 F.2d at 127.
The court held that, while a fraudulent conveyance action was not itself property of the
estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), the Florida action was still subject to the
automatic stay under U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) as an action "against the debtor." Id. at 131-32. Th
court rejected the argument that 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(17)-(19) worked an implicit partial repeal
of 11 US.C. § 362, noting (1) that Congress had given "careful consideration" to the coordina-
tion of the banking law amendments with the existing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and
had made amendments where necessary; (2) that allowing the FDIC to proceed outside the
bankruptcy case would place an undue burden on the bankruptcy trustee, who would be required
to identify actions brought by the FDIC, and then seek to intervene; and (3) that the FDIC was
free to seek relief from the automatic stay. Id. at 133-34. Also the court held that 12 U.S.C. §
1821(), which provides that "no court may take any action ... to restrain or affect the exer-
cise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or receiver," did not preclude appli-
cation of the automatic stay, because the stay arises by operation of law, not as an injunction
issued by a court. Id. at 135-36.
52. Under the reasoning of Colonial Realty, even actions to recover property conveyed be-
yond the applicable statute of limitations might be barred, even though the trustee could not
otherwise seek to avoid the transfer. Presumably, relief from stay would be appropriate here. 11
U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994). However, it might be argued that under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) the trustee
could assert the FDIC's right to avoid fraudulent conveyances accomplished as many as five
years preceding the appointment of the FDIC as receiver. Under the rule of Moore v. Bay, 284
U.S. 4 (1931), the trustee can avoid the entire transaction for the benefit of the estate, and is
not limited to the amount owed to the particular creditor. See also 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994).
As such, relief from stay might not be appropriate, in that the trustee would have rights to the
remaining proceeds of avoidance once the FDIC's debt was repaid in full.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) sets out the two permissible bases for relief from stay (1) lack of
adequate protection; or (2) the debtor does not have any equity in such property and the prop-
erty is not necessary to an effective reorganization. Only the second rationale is likely to matter.
The argument over whether to lift the stay will force the court to determine at the outset of the
preference litigation whether the claim is subject to the FDIC's superpriority.
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F. Integrating the FDIC's Superpriority into the Bankruptcy Code's
Distribution Scheme
This is a terrible outcome, and one that could have been avoided
had members of the drafting committee paid even minimal attention to
integrating the FDIC's superpriority under § 1821(d)(17)(D) into the
Bankruptcy Code's distribution scheme. As noted above, the Bankruptcy
Code contains numerous group-specific priorities, for employees, 4
farmers and fisherman," the IRS,56  union members, 7  and
retirees.58 In each case, however, Congress took steps to ensure that
Congress' redistributive decision did not operate to reduce the aggregate
size of the estate5
With the priorities contained in § 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
this integration is accomplished by ensuring that the administrative
expenses of the estate are accorded top priority.' Under §§ 1113 and
1114 the Code's mechanism is somewhat more complicated. While
these sections accord administrative expense priority to retiree medical
benefits6' and to certain wage claims of union members,62 the Code
mandates an ingenious (if complicated) bargaining process63 under
which (1) the absence of a similar priority under Chapter 764 creates a
powerful incentive for employees who benefit from the priority under
Chapter 11 to ensure the success of the reorganization, and (2) judicial
review is available where no agreement can be reached.' Neither of
these devices provides a blueprint for integrating the FDIC's
54. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(3)-(a)(4).
55. 11 U.s.c. § 507(a)(5).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
57. I1 U.S.C. § 1113.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1114.
59. Oddly, as the Colonial Realty court noted, the Crime Control Act itself contains provi-
sions amending the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. 980 F.2d at 132. Section 2522 of
the Crime Control Act amends § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide an exception from
discharge for claims based on a failure to honor a commitment to maintain capital of an in-
sured institution, and creates an eighth priority claim under § 507 for such claims.
60. I1 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).
.61. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(1).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
63. The procedure for modifying collective bargaining agreements is set forth in subsections
(b)-(f) of 11 U.S.C. § 1113. The procedure for modifying retiree medical benefit plans is set
forth subsections (f)-(k) of 11 U.S.C. § 1114.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c); 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g).
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superpriority into the Bankruptcy Code's distribution scheme. The bar-
gaining process used in §§ 1113 and 1114 is simply too cumbersome
and bears no relation to the legislative goal of encouraging avoidance
actions.' In addition, enacting a § 507 priority is imperfect, because
the FDIC has a claim only to the proceeds of certain assets.
Instead, the most obvious solution to the problem created by
§ 1821(d)(17)(D) would be to grant the FDIC a lien on any recovery of
an intentional fraudulent conveyance instead of a superpriority. The
FDIC would then obtain an allowed secured claim under 11 U.S.C. §
506, and, under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c), the trustee could deduct the cost
of recovering the conveyance from the proceeds otherwise payable to
the FDIC, thereby preserving the trustee's incentive to investigate and
pursue fraudulent conveyances. This proposed solution is not complete.
It leaves open the possibility for litigation over whether a particular
avoided transfer is an intentional fraud or merely a constructive fraud
or preference. The need for this litigation could be further reduced,
though not entirely eliminated, if the superpriority were construed to
apply only to avoidance actions based solely on an intentional fraud
theory which do not fall within any of the bankruptcy trustee's other
avoiding powers (i.e. preferences or constructive fraudulent conveyanc-
es). This approach would leave intact the trustee's incentive to identify
fraudulent conveyances and prosecute avoidance actions; it would elimi-
nate the need for most litigation over the application of the priority;
and, it would also accomplish at least some of the redistribution appar-
ently desired by Congress.
While this solution is not perfect, it appears to approximate what
Congress intended when it granted the FDIC its superpriority. However,
this proposal is also inconsistent with the plain language of the statute,
and therefore not a solution that can be adopted by judicial interpre-
tation. No lien interest is created by § 1821(d)(17), and there is there-
fore no basis for treating the FDIC's claim as a secured claim under
§ 506.
66. Both 11 U.S.C. § 1113 and 11 U.S.C. § 1114 are intended to ameliorate the hardship
which would be inflicted on employees and retirees if the debtor were permitted to reject col-
lective bargaining agreements and retiree medical benefit plans under 11 US.C. § 365 without
being required to bargain. Section 1113 was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's deai-
sion in NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). Thomas R.. Haggard. The Continuing Conflict
Between Bankruptcy and Labor Law - The Issues that Bildisco and the 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments Did Not Resolve, 1986 B.Y.U. L REv. 1, 3-4. Section 1114 was enacted in re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's decision in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.. 496
U.S. 633 (1990). Keating, supra note 35. at 17-18.
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II. THE DANGERS OF LEGISLATING IN THE WAKE OF THE COLLAPSE
OF AN IRON TRIANGLE-THE INADEQUACY OF
DESTABILIZING SOLUTIONS
This wrongheaded superpriority could simply be dismissed as an
example of bad statutory drafting. However, when placed in historical
context, and viewed through the lens of interest group theory, a richer
explanation emerges. This statute emerges as a paradigmatic and cau-
tionary example of legislation enacted in the wake of the collapse of an
iron triangle. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to lay
some groundwork: first, by explaining the term iron triangle and the
problem that it presents for democratic theory; and second, by describ-
ing the iron triangle in the banking industry, its growth, and its col-
lapse. Then it is possible to explain how the politics of the collapsed
iron triangle caused both the passage of and the problems with the
FDIC's fraudulent conveyance power, the statute is a product of the
unchecked pursuit by legislators and regulators of their respective insti-
tutional interests, made possible by the exclusion of the regulated indus-
try from the regulatory process.
A. The Collective Action Problem and Iron Triangles
1. Political Participation as a Public Good
The Madisonian vision of representative government articulated in
Federalist 1067 acknowledges the risk that any single arm of govern-
ment is susceptible to control by faction (or to put it in modem par-
lance, susceptible to "capture"). In order to guard against this risk,
Madison proposed a system of government premised on the principle of
separation of powers.68 By distributing power, various interests could
pursue their goals in the political process, while the risk that any one
interest or coalition of interests would gain control of all branches
would be reduced. This perception has informed what has been de-
scribed as the optimistic strand of pluralist theory, exemplified by the
work of Robert Dahl.69
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, cd., 1961).
68. Id.
69. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
For Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 281 n.20 (1988). See ROBERT DAIL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956). See also TRUMAN, supra note 14.
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In his book The Logic of Collective Action,"0 Mancur Olson argues
that this risk of faction may be more intractable than the early Federal-
ists believed. Olson's insight goes to the very heart of the American
aspiration to self government. The Madisonian vision is based on the
conviction that given a proper set of checks and balances, representative
government can be relied upon to govern in the public interest. Olson
argues, however, that microeconomic principles dictate that the problem
of faction will be much more pervasive and intractable than Madison,
and pluralists inspired by the Madisonian vision, imagined.!'
The problem for Olson begins with the problem of public goods.
The market, he argues, if left to itself, will not provide the appropriate
amount of a public good. ' Public goods are defined as goods (a com-
mon example is a street lamp) for which (1) there is jointness of sup-
ply (in other words, the use of the resource by one consumer does not
reduce the supply of the resource to another consumer); and (2) the
benefits are non-excludable (all who use the thoroughfare benefit from
the placement of the street lamp, regardless of whether they contributed
to its construction). 3 Where these two conditions are met, even where
the sum of the benefit to all consumers exceeds the cost of providing
the public good (if even one accident or mugging is avoided, the street
lamp will have paid for itself), the good will likely not be provided
because each individual consumer, acting rationally, will seek to free
ride (no individual driver is willing to bear the cost of the street
lamp).74 Without some method for compelling contributions, the public
70. MANCUR OLSON, THE LoGic OF COLLEctiVE AcnoN (2d ed. 1971).
71. The concept of the collective action problem as a Madisonian nightmare is mor fully
developed in Eskridge, supra note 69, at 280.
72. OLsON, supra note 70, at 36 ("The larger a group is, the farther it will fall short of ob-
mining an optimal supply of any collective good, and the less likely that it will act to obtain
even a minimal amount of such a good. In short, the larger the group, the less it will further
its common interests.").
73. I. at 14 n.21. Olson notes that the free riding problem may present itself even when
the jointness of.supply requirement is relaxed somewhat. Id.
74. This free rider problem has been likened to a prisoner's dilemma game. In the prisones
dilemma, partners in crime are brought to the police station and interrogated separately. Each is
faced with the following hypothetical set of alternatives. If both suspects cooperate with each
other and refuse to confess to the crime, they will both go free. If one suspect confesses and
the other refuses, the non-confessing suspect will serve 17 years, and the confessing suspect will
serve one year. If both suspects confess, then both will serve 10 years.
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good is either not provided or is underprovided."
Olson takes this common sense example one step further: he notes
that political participation is like a street lamp. Interest groups organize
to further the objectives of their members in the political process. As
Dennis Mueller has put it, "The commonality of the goals of an interest
group's members makes the achievement of these goals a public good
for the group, and thus gives rise to the same incentives to free ride as
exist in all public good prisoners' dilemma situations. 6 Olson's work
leads to two conclusions: "(1) It is easier to form an interest group
when the number of potential members is small than when the number
Prisoner 1





I 10, 10 I 1, 17
17, 1 I 0,0
The rational suspect will look at this game and will recognize that both he and his accomplice
face a similar incentive to confess. Acting rationally and strategically, he will confess himself,
in the hope of getting the reduced sentence of 10 years and to avoid getting the longer sen-
tence of 17 years, in the event that his accomplice acts rationally and confesses himself. As a
result, both serve 10 years, when, if they had both refused to confess, they would both have
gone free. Both players would benefit from cooperation, but each individual player acting ratio-
nally has an incentive to defect. MUELLER, supra note 4, at 9-15. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994). For an excellent description of the role of the col-
lective action problem in the development of bankruptcy law, see THoMAs JACKSON, THE Looic
AND LIMTS OF BANKR UF LAW (1986) (arguing that resolving the collective action problem
faced by creditors of an insolvent debtor is the sole purpose for the federal bankruptcy scheme);
Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54
U. C. L. REV. 815 (1987). But see, Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imper.
fect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336 (1993) (the purpose of the bankruptcy scheme is to distrib-
ute the losses associated with business failure); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm.
L. REv. 775 (1987) (arguing same proposition).
75. MUELLER, supra note 4, at 13; OLSON, supra note 70, at 36, 50-51, 132-67.
76. MUELLER, supra note 4, at 308; OLSON, supra note 70, at 9-16 ("the achievement of any
common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means that a public or collective good
has been provided for that group.").
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is large... [; and (2)] the appearance of organizations that effectively
represent large numbers of individuals requires that 'separate and
'selective' incentive(s)' be used to curb free-riding behavior."
2. The Logic of Iron Triangles
Once it is recognized that political participation is a public good,
the development of iron triangles appears as an obvious consequence of
the collective action problem, at least where a governmental program
will benefit a concentrated group and the costs will be distributed over
a relatively larger group. Thus, when Olson's insight is applied to the
legislative and regulatory processes, it yields the prediction, amplified
by Stigler,7 Posner,79 and others, that the regulatory process will be-
come a mechanism for transferring benefits from large diffuse groups to
smaller, well organized, groups. To put it in Olson's terms, "there is a
systematic tendency for 'exploitation' of the great by the small."
The iron triangle metaphor describes the way in which the collec-
tive action problem can allow concentrated interest groups to overcome
the Madisonian system of checks and balances and yield a legislative
process that is controlled, at least in certain areas, by either the bene-
fitted group or regulated industry. Where the costs and benefits of a
particular program are distributed asymmetrically (where the benefitted
group is concentrated and the group bearing the costs is diffuse or vice
versa), as in the context of government expenditures and government
regulation, it is likely that the system of checks and balances will not
prevent the capture of the legislative or regulatory process by the bene-
fitted class or by the regulated industry. For example, where the rele-
vant outcome of the political process is a defense expenditure, no indi-
vidual taxpayer has an economic incentive to become involved in the
appropriations process. Only the defense contractor has sufficient stake
77. MuELLEP, supra note 4, at 308 (characterizing OLSON. supra note 70. at 9-16, 22-65.
51).
78. Stigler, supra note 7, at 3 ("[R]egulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated primarily for its benefit.").
79. Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L REV. 47, 86 (1969)
(hereinafter Posner, Federal Trade Commission). See PCHARD POSHEpt, THE ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAw 524-37 (4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter POSNER, Eo ONMic ANALYSIs). See also, Joseph
D. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 279 (1984); Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
80. OLSON, supra note 70, at 29. See MUElt. supra note 4, at 309.
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in the outcome to take an interest in the substance of legislation. Simi-
larly, where the legislative output is a regulation, only the regulated
industry has a sufficient stake to be a consistent player in the regulato-
ry process.
An iron triangle develops when the regulated industry or benefitted
group captures both the executive agency charged with regulating a
particular industry or administering certain expenditure programs, and
the relevant legislative committees. In the classic case, the agency is
captured through the phenomenon of the "revolving door." The execu-
tive agency draws its officials from the regulated industry or benefitted
group, while the regulated industry exercises power over the regulators
by holding out the prospect of jobs in the private sector once the
regulators' days of public service are over.8 Similarly, capture of the
legislative committee is accomplished through the selective application
of political campaign contributions.8 2 But, even in the absence of a
revolving door or campaign contributions, the collective action problem
suggests that a concentrated group will have disproportionate influence
in the political process, because only where the costs or benefits of
regulation are concentrated will individuals have sufficient incentive to
participate.
B. The Collective Action Problem and the Iron Triangle in the
Banking Industry
1. The Iron Triangle and Bank Deregulation
It is not difficult to discern the influence of the regulated industry
81. ROBERT C. FELLMETH ET AL., THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE RALPH
NADER GROUP REPORT ON THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND TRANSPORTATION
311-325 (1970), reprinted in Stephen Breyer & Richard B. Stewart, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY PoLICY 139 (2d ed. 1985) ("Job interchange levels between the ICC and industry
have grown, with 'deferred bribes' becoming the norm. Many officials admit they receive job
offers from industry while in government employ. In the past decade all but one Commissioner
who has left the agency has ended up working for a carrier or a carrier association directly, or
indirectly as an ICC Practitioner."); Posner, Federal Trade Commission, supra note 79, at 86
("He [the staff member] will receive no bonus upon entry (or reentry) into private practice for
the vigorous championing of the consumer interest. The gratitude of consumers ... cannot be
translated into a larger practice. On the other hand, the enmity of the organized economic inter-
ests .... may do him some later harm.").
82. Posner, Federal Trade Commission, supra note 79, at 82 ("Congress is organized in a
manner calculated to protect and foster parochial economic interests at the expense of the larger
consumer interest .... Moreover, in bidding for the favor of members of Congress, consumers
are at a disadvantage in comparison with trade associations, labor unions, and other more famil-
iar pressure groups.").
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on the shape of bank deregulation during the 1980s, or to identify the
participants in the iron triangle: the regulators in this instance were the
FDIC and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC);
the relevant legislators were those on the House and Senate banking
committees; and the most evident lobbyists on behalf of the industry
were the U.S. League of Savings Institutions and the American Bankers
Association.83
Fig. 3
THE TRIANGLE OF BANK REGULATION
House and Senate Banking Committees
/\
/ \
FDIC. and FSLIC ---- American Bankers
Association and U.S. League
of Savings Institutions
Even at the outset, however, the federal insurance regime for savings
and loans showed signs of industry influence on the regulatory
scheme.' The rationale for bank regulation during the early 1930s was
that excessive competition created instability in an industry where insta-
bility could lead to industry-wide collapse. Concern about the health of
one institution could trigger a bank run and the failure of that institu-
tion.
Such runs were perceived to be contagious and to endanger the
entire banking system. To deal with the problem of bank runs, Con-
gress created the federal bank insurance scheme. However, when the
FSLIC and FDIC were created, Congress rejected the normal insurance
83. See infra text accompanying note 99. Financial regulation is certainly not the only area
where the regulated industry has had significant effect on legislation. For a number of years, the
Pentagon opposed the continued efforts to develop the V-22 Osprey helicopter (in their view it
was crash prone and had no particular mission). Nonetheless, defense contr.ctors managed to re-
place the program in the budget each year. House Leader Fights Back on V-22, DEF. DAILY.
April 13, 1992, at 75. See also David H. Hackworth, Rancor in the Ranks: The Troops vs. the
President, NEWSWEEK, June 28, 1993, at 24, 25 ("[Clinton) has wasted scarce defense dollars
on pork like the unneeded Seawolf submarine, unflyable C-17 cargo. aircraft and the accident-
prone Osprey Helicopter.").
84. LAwRENCE J. WHna, THE S&L DEBACLE 55 (1991). See also Hammond & Knott, supra
note 13, at 13; Robert C. West, The Evolution and Devolution of Bank Regulation In the
United States, 17 L ECON. IssuEs 361 (1983).
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structure of risk based premiums, and chose instead to rely on a lower
rate structure." The rationale was that "tighter federal regulatory pro-
cedures would lessen future losses. '8 6 Toward this end, Congress
placed restrictions on the types of investments that thrifts could make,
limiting them to long term, fixed rate residential mortgages. To deal
with the problem of excessive competition, federal and state regulatory
agencies enacted regulation that expressly limited competition:
These restrictions (which usually applied at least as stringently
to commercial banks) included: (1) a reluctance at both the
federal and state levels to grant new charters to de novo en-
trants or even to grant applications for new branches to incum-
bent thrifts, where the new branch would encroach on another
incumbent's territory; (2) limits by some states on the within-
state geographic regions in which branching was permissible
under any circumstances; (3) restrictions by virtually all states
that made interstate branching impossible; and (4) a federal
regulation that limited a thrift to making mortgage loans on
properties that were no greater than fifty miles from the thrift's
home or branch offices .... 87
A cynical view would suggest that these restrictions were a product not
of public-interested regulation, but of rent seeking 8 behavior by the
industry, which received the benefits of restricted competition and artifi-
cially inexpensive insurance.8 9 Regardless of the reasons, the system
85. WrrrE, supra note 84, at 55.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 59. "A justification that was frequently offered for these restrictions was that ex-
cessive competition among banks had been a contributory cause to the widespread failures of
the early 1930s; hence, banks and thrifts had to be protected and prevented from competing too
vigorously with one another." Id.
88. For a discussion of rent seeking, see MUELLER, supra note 4, at 229 ("The government
can, for example, help create, increase, or protect a group's monopoly position. In so doing, the
government increases the monopoly rents of the favored groups, at the expense of the group's
products or services. The monopoly rents that the government can help provide are a prize
worth pursuing, and the pursuit of these rents has been given the name of
rent seeking.").
89. One such commentator put it this way:
Over the years the S&Ls developed an unusually cozy relationship with the regulators
who were supposed to be watching over them. In fact, the S&Ls were put in charge
of their own regulation. The twelve Home Loan Banks were actually owned by the
thrifts themselves, even though they took the form of an arm of the government. In
practice, nearly all the board members of these regulatory banks were thrift executives
or people with close ties to the S&L industry, with no allegiance or obligation to the
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worked for more than a generation. Savings and loans were by and
large successful, and there were very few failures.90 As one commen-
tator has put it:
As a consequence of the financial regulations, features charac-
teristic of cartels began to emerge. Under the regulated regime,
banks and S&Ls achieved exceptionally high profit margins
compared to other comparable-sized industries. High profit mar-
gins were combined with a low probability of business failure.
Between 1944 and 1974 fewer than ten banks failed per year in
the United States.91
The first major flaw in the regulatory scheme appeared during the
mid-1960s. The principal business of savings and loans was "borrowing
short and lending long." Savings and loans would invest primarily in
long term, fixed rate mortgages. They would fund these loans with
short term obligations-typically demand deposits. 3 The problem in-
herent in this capital structure is that it is extremely sensitive to interest
rate volatility. So long as interest rates remained stable or fell, savings
and loans made healthy profits. However, when America's increasing
involvement in the Vietnam war and constriction of the money supply
by the federal reserve caused interest rates to rise,' thrifts found
themselves borrowing at higher interest rates, with no corresponding
increase in income from their investments (a 6% mortgage yields 6%
even if the bank must pay 8% interest on passbook savings ac-
counts). 95
The first regulatory response was through the use of Regulation Q,
which limited the rates on passbook accounts.' This approach worked
until the mid 1970s when interest rates rose so high that savings ac-
counts were no longer attractive investments and depositors started
taxpayer.
WAI.MAN, supra note 3, at 18.
90. WALDmAN, supra note 3, at 18; White, supra note 84, at 61.
91. Hammond & Knott, supra note 12, at 14.
92. WHrrT, supra note 84, at 61.
93. Id.; see also WALDmAN, supra note 3, at 15.
94. Hammond & Knott, supra note 12, at 15 ("In the late 1960s the... Fcdal Open
Market Commission (FOMC), became concerned about the inflationary potential of the Vietnam
war and the growing domestic expenditures for social welfare. The FOMC decided to squeeze
credit out of the banking system .... The FOMC did this in 1966 and 1969 by raising the
discount rate....").
95. WITE, supra note 84, at 61.
96. Id. at 62-65; Hammond & Knott, supra note 12, at 15.
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moving their money elsewhere, in particular to money market mutual
funds, which bore interest and had limited check writing privilegesY
The regulatory response to the interest rate squeeze of the 1970s
was the deregulation of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Regulators
removed the restrictions on the types of investments that thrifts could
make, lowered net capital requirements, expanded the protection of
deposit insurance, and liberalized accounting rules.98 This move to de-
regulate started during the Carter administration and gathered momen-
tum as a result of the first Reagan administration's generalized efforts
to deregulate9 But, an important reason for the success and shape of
the deregulation program was the effort expended by the S&L lobby to
win over key legislators. For example, during the 1980s, the S&L lobby
contributed over $200,000 to the campaigns of Senator Don Riegle, a
member, and later chairman, of the Senate Banking Committee."0
Former FSLIC director Peter Steams once commented, "The Bank
Board doesn't regulate anything unless the U.S. League and the top
S&Ls agree."' 1 As a result, deregulation occurred without regard to
the facts that: (1) insured deposits were involved, and (2) the insurance
regime did not rely on risk based premiums. Little existed in the new
regulatory structure to force the newly deregulated thrifts to internalize
97. Nicole Fradette et al., Project: Regulatory Reform: A Survey of the Impact of
Reregulation and Deregulation on Selected Industries and Sectors, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 643-
664 (1995).
98. WHITE, supra note 84, at 72-90. One other aspect of deregulation occurred in the early
1970s: the relaxation of the rules regulating who could own an S&L. WALDMAN, supra note 3,
at 21.
99. Some commentators have suggested that the deregulation of the late 1970s and early
1980s disproves the economic model of regulation. See DERTMCK- & QUIRK, supra note 2, at
26-27. At least in the banking industry, however, this does not appear to be the case. A nuni-
ber of authors have offered explanations which suggest that the deregulation in the banking
industry was more a product of the iron triangle than its refutation. Michael Waldman shows
that the industry lobbied heavily for the passage of the Gan-St. Germain bill, the principal leg-
islation deregulating the industry. WALMAN, supra note 3, at 50-67. Hammond and Knott dis-
cuss a process they describe as a "deregulatory snowball" which occurred in the financial ser-
vices sector. As they put it:
[e]conomic and technological change, coupled with important legal decisions, reduced
the value of the regulatory status quo for many regulated firms and provided outside
competitors with incentive and opportunity to enter the industry. Initial changes in
regulation put pressure on other regulations, and these too were modified. Still other
regulations now became critical, and pressure to modify these [began to build].
HAMMOND & KNOTt, supra note 13, at 22. See also, HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGU-
LATION FAILED 1-20 (1991).
100. WALDMAN, supra note 3, at 61.
101. Id. at 64.
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the costs associated with making risky investments." 2 Indeed, the new
regulatory regime unintentionally encouraged troubled thrifts to gamble
with taxpayers' money. The more losses increased, the more the bank-
ers were encouraged to make increasingly risky investments in the hope
of returning the institution to profitability.
The end of this story is well known. The failure of deregulation
created a crisis in the thrift industry that is still being resolved." The
failures of savings and loans during the late 1980s depleted and ulti-
mately destroyed the FSLIC, and forced the recapitalization of the bank
insurance fund at taxpayers' expense.
2. The Bank Bailout and the Collapse of the Iron Triangle
If the metaphor of the iron triangle explains the development of the
bank regulatory scheme prior to the bank bailout, that metaphor re-
mained apt through the early stages of the bailout as well. °4 Howev-
er, as the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
of 1989 ("FIRREA") moved toward passage," and certainly by the
time Congress enacted the Crime Control Act of 1990,'0 the new
metaphor had become legislation in the wake of a collapsed iron trian-
gle.
Michael Waldman notes that by the time FIRREA made its way
through the House of Representatives, public attention had focused on
the crisis in the thrift industry, and "the mood of the House [had]
swung to a new unaccustomed stance: being tough on the S&Ls."''
When Congress returned to the field a year later to enact the Crime
Control Act of 1990, the terms of the discussion had shifted; the focus
was on punishing the industry and recovering assets. The House Report
begins:
102. WHrrE, supra note 84, at 67-82.
103. For accounts of the crisis in the thrift industry see, KATHLEEN DAY, S&L HELL (1993);
EDWARD . KANE, T1m S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? (1989); PAUL Z. PUZER,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY. THE INSIDE STORY OF THE S&L MEss (1989); STEEN PizZO Er
AL., INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMmICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS (1989).
104. WALDMIAN, supra note 3, at 102-117.
105. Id. at 109 ("By the time the legislation reached the House floor, a full fledged stampede
against the S&Ls was underway.").
106. Id at 109, 116.
107. Id. at 116. FIRREA passed in August of 1989, shortly before the depth of the savings
and loan crisis was understood. Congress had not yet begun investigating Lincoln Saving, and
the names of the Keating Five were not yet familiar to the American public. By 1990, Con-
gress had a much greater public relations problem on its hands. See supra note 18.
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The Purpose of Title XXI, Banking Law Enforcement, is to en-
hance the enforcement powers of the Department of Justice and
the Federal financial institution regulatory agencies with respect
to unlawful activities affecting federally insured financial institu-
tions .. .. Since last August, when [FIRREA] became effec-
tive, the losses from failed financial institutions have ballooned.
Reports of criminal activity and grossly excessive behavior that
led to the dramatic decline of the savings and loan industry
have proliferated. Title XX responds to the public outcry to
bring to justice whose who defrauded the savings and loan
industry by providing Federal regulating agencies, Federal pros-
ecutors, and law enforcement agencies with additional tools to
combat fraud and abuse affecting financial institutions.
0 8
The iron triangle had disintegrated.
Thus, the Crime Control Act can be viewed as legislation enacted
in the wake of a collapsed iron triangle. As such, it offers an opportu-
nity to test the wisdom of the proposed destabilizing solutions to the
problem of the iron triangle.
C. Legislating in the Wake of a Collapsed Iron Triangle: Enhancing
the Principal/Agent Problem as a Result of Reduced Participation
Given the amount of criticism that has been directed at the bank
regulatory scheme, it might appear to be an unequivocally good thing
to reverse the trend, smash the iron triangle, and exclude the regulated
industry from the regulatory process. However, the FDIC's superpriority
under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(D) demonstrates that legislation in the
wake of a collapsed iron triangle has its own peculiar set of risks.
These risks are of two types. The first is an increased risk of prin-
cipal/agent problems. When an iron triangle collapses, there is an in-
creased risk that either Congress or the agency will go unchecked in
pursuing its respective institutional interests, rather than the public inter-
est generally. Second, there is an increased risk of substantive mistake
which results from reduced participation by the industry. Both risks are
plainly manifested in the superpriority granted to the FDIC as part of
the Crime Control Act.
108. H.R. REP. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 170-1 (1990) (emphasis added).
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1. The Principal/Agent Problem-Players and Their Goals
The principal/agent problem in administrative law can be viewed
from either of two related perspectives: some scholars focus on the
problem of agency control by the electorate, while others focus on the
control of the agency by the executive or Congress."° The iron trian-
gle is problematic on both fronts. By concentrating influence in the
regulated industry, it undercuts presidential and congressional control of
the bureaucracy, and it causes regulation to diverge from the public
interest.
To understand the effect of this principal/agent problem on the
shape of the FDIC's fraudulent conveyance power as enacted, it is nec-
essary to identify the players responsible for its enactment and to detail
how their peculiar interests contributed to the enactment of the FDIC's
ill-conceived superpriority. After the collapse of the iron triangle, the
major relevant players were the FDIC and the House and Senate bank-
ing committees. Noticeably absent from the table were the banks and
the banking industry." 0
a. The FDIC-Protect the Fund
William Niskanen's "iron law of bureaucracy" posits that agencies
act to maximize their budgets."' Peter Swire has argued persuasively,
however, that where the FDIC is concerned, a slight twist is neces-
sary."' The FDIC, he suggests, learned from the demise of FSLIC
that the key to institutional survival is to maximize and protect the
insurance fund rather than its budget per se."' The FDIC's legislative
goal, Swire asserts, is to protect the fund by shifting the cost of bailing
out failed banks to other sources." 4
109. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
110. Peter Swim has suggested that the FDIC's superpowers in the bank insolvency regime
can be traced to a desire by the FDIC to protect the insuance fund and a desire by Congress
to hide the costs associated with financing the bank bailout. Swir, supra note 39. at 521.
While Swire does not discuss the FDIC's superpriority in fraudulent conveyance reco 'cies. this
superpriority fits comfortably within his analysis.
111. WaLiAM A. NIsKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRmENTATIVE GOVERNMNT 36-41
(1971).
112. Swire, supra note 39, at 521.
113. Swire points out that if the FDIC were seeking to maximize its budget, it might be ex-
pected to seek to hold and manage properties, rather than selling them off as quickly as possi-
ble. Id at 523.
114. Il at 521-5.
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b. Congress-Shoot the Bad Guys
While the FDIC seeks to protect the insurance fund, members of
Congress seek to protect their jobs. Legislators seeking reelection" 5
seek to take credit for positive outcomes and to avoid responsibility for
policy failures.'16
When this model of legislative self-interest is applied to the politics
of the bank bailout, it suggests an interesting set of motives. Legislators
wish to ensure simultaneously (1) that they take none of the blame for
the banking crisis, and (2) that they are identified with the solution. In
other words, first, legislators will seek to deflect attention from the
deregulation of the thrift industry and FIRREA, as causes for the cur-
rent crisis in the banking industry. Who better to blame than the
Charles Keatings of the world?117 Second, once the scapegoat has
been identified, legislators will choose a legislative strategy which pur-
ports to shift the costs to the scapegoat but in fact shifts the costs to
anyone but the voters in their district (at least not in a traceable way)
(i.e., no new taxes to prop up the insurance fund).
In the case of the FDIC's superpriority, the interests of the FDIC
and Congress complemented each other extremely well. Both the FDIC
and the Congress wanted to shift the costs of the bank bailout. Further,
they wanted to ensure both that the blame for the problem landed on
the so called "thrift kingpins," and that the cost of the solution rested,
115. Eskridge, supra note 69, at 288 (1988) ("Public choice theory argues that legislative be-
havior is driven by one central goal - the legislator's desire to be reelected."). See MORRIs P.
FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABIiSHMENT (1977) (arguing that the
primary goal of the typical member of Congress is reelection); DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS:
THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974) (characterizing the modem Congress as an assembly of
professional politicians seeking continual reelection). Legislative self interest is not the only
force which motivates legislators. Judge Mikva has argued convincingly that most legislators at
least think they are legislating in the public interest. Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L.
REV. 167 (1988). But where an iron triangle has collapsed, or has been smashed, concern about
reelection is likely to loom particularly large for legislators associated with the failed regulatory
regime. See supra note 18.
116. Swire, supra note 39, at 526-27 (citing R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRES-
SiONAL AcTION (1990)). The three elements that make a position traceable are (1) a perceptible
effect (i.e., does the position affect the voters); (2) an identifiable government action; and (3) a
visible contribution by the legislator.
117. Representative Frank Annunzio, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and a well known friend to the S&L industry, found himself in a particularly tight
race while the Crime Control Act was pending in Congress. He took to wearing a lapel pin
which read "Jail the S&L Crooks." He was reelected. Paul Starobin, Beyond the Bailout, 22
NAT'L J. 2238 (1990); Janet Hook, On the Hill: Unencumbered, NEW RE UBiuc, Dec. 3, 1990,
at 13.
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or at least appeared to rest, on these bad guys. The effects of this alli-
ance are evident in language from the legislative history of the Crime
Control Act, which cites criminal activity as the cause for the crisis and
offers shooting the bad guys as the solution. The effects of this alliance
are also apparent in the substance of the FDIC's superpriority. The
redistribution caused by the superpriority can be seen as a hidden tax
passed in order to help fund the bank bailout.
While critics of the iron triangle focus on rent seeking by the regu-
lated industry, it is easy to forget that the agency and the legislators
each have their own interests as well, which may or may not coincide
with the public interest. These distinct interests do not miraculously
converge with the public interest just because one of the participants in
the triangle has disappeared. Under this view, the FDIC's superpriority
can be seen as the product of legislators and regulators pursuing their
own institutional interests, rather than the public interest per se.
2. Reduced Participation-A Failure of Pluralism
Legislation in the wake of the collapse of an iron triangle presents
yet another more troubling risk: the risk of reduced participation. As
discussed above, the iron triangle is a problem of pluralism. As a result
of the collective action problem (discussed supra part I.A), and of the
fact that the regulated industry is a concentrated group, while the public
is diffuse, the iron triangle is attributable to too little participation in
the political process by affected groups. Therefore, weakening any one
leg of the triangle or excluding an affected group from the regulatory
process is likely to make this problem worse. While the critics of the
iron triangle focus on mutual back scratching, the iron triangle also
facilitates mutual oversight of legislation; this quality control mechanism
is weakened when one leg of the triangle is eliminated.
Here, because the banks were perceived as the principal proponents
of bank deregulation-a product of the iron triangle in the early
1980s-they had little leverage in the negotiations over how the prob-
lems that deregulation created would be resolved. Where smashing the
iron triangle means that fewer groups will be at the table, the result
may be to eliminate a check on the agency and the legislators, and to
reduce the amount of scrutiny that the legislation receives. When this is
recognized, a collapsed iron triangle looks not like an improvement, but
instead like a new, and perhaps worse, failure of the political process.
The legislative history of the Crime Control Act provides support
for this hypothesis. In an earlier draft of the legislation, the FDIC was
19951
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given a similar priority over all private claimants in suits against the
officers, directors, attorneys, accountants, and other employees and
agents of a failed depository institution (the "O&D Priority"). However,
both Republican and Democratic members of Congress noted that the
O&D Priority would eliminate the incentive to bring private suits and
would lead to underenforcement. The provision was removed." 8 In-
deed, although it never made it through the House of Representatives,
the Senate adopted the O&D Priority three times: in its versions of
FIRREA in 1989; n  in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990; t20 and in its version of Title XXV of the Crime Control Act of
1990.121
Thus, the desire to protect the fund and shift the cost of the bank
bailout generated two equally ill-considered superpriorities. Where the
superpriority was aimed at a group which could organize easily to
challenge legislation-lawyers who bring shareholder derivative
suits-the problem with the statute was identified in Congress. Where,
by contrast, the affected group was the diffuse group of general unse-
cured creditors in unspecified bankruptcies, whose best organized repre-
sentative is the banking lobby," which was viewed as the cause of
118. The House Report notes:
During the House Judiciary Committee's consideration of H.R. 5269, the Committee
rejected by a voice vote an amendment that would have changed current law and
given the Resolution Trust Corporation and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
a priority over all private claimants in suits against the officers, directors, attorneys,
accountants, and other employees and agents of a failed depository institution. A
similar priority provision was rejected last year by the House-Senate conference on
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. Subse-
quently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's argument that such a priority exists under
current law. Members of the Judiciary Committee on both sides of the aisle who
opposed the amendment noted that the effect of such a provision would be to elimi-
nate private rights of action, which in turn would lead to more savings and loan
fraud and ultimately a higher cost to the American taxpayer. Such a provision, there-
fore, has not been included ....
H.R. REP. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 170-71 (1990) (emphasis added). For an
excellent discussion of the history of this provision, see Samantha Evans, Note, An FDIC Pri-
ority of Claims Over Depository Institution Shareholders, 41 DUKE LJ. 329, 359-66 (1991), and
compare Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted, 933 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.
1990) (holding that the FDIC's claims against bank officers and directors had priority over
stockholders' direct claims against officers and directors) with FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537
(lth Cir. 1989) (holding that the FDIC was not entitled to absolute priority over other claims).
119. S. 774, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 214(o) (1989).
120. S. 3209, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2006 (1990).
121. S. 3194, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 208 (1990).
122. While the creditor's lobby is not usually without power, see Robert E. Scott, The Politics
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the problem, no effective opposition materialized, and the problem with
the statute was not identified.
Because of a lack of opposition, the FDIC got what it asked for in
the Crime Control Act. However, due to the same lack of opposition,
the FDIC failed to realize that because of sloppy drafting, it was
shooting itself in the foot. If the banks had been present at the drafting
table, it is likely that they too would have pointed out that the FDIC's
superpriority would lead to both reduced enforcement of fraudulent
conveyance laws (the same infirmity in the statute that was raised by
opponents of the O&D Priority) and to reduced recoveries for the
FDIC.
D. The Inadequacy of Destabilizing Solutions: Conclusions
The phenomenon of the iron triangle constitutes a distortion of the
political process and creates an opportunity for rent seeking. The pre-
ceding analysis suggests the inadequacy of the solutions suggested by
those who would solve the problem by weakening one or another leg
of the triangle." The history of the FDIC's priority in fraudulent
conveyance recoveries reveals that such solutions may make the prob-
lem worse in two important respects: (1) there is a greater risk that
weakening one leg may make it easier for the remaining participants in
the regulatory process to pursue their own institutional or parochial
interests; and (2) because the number of participants in the regulatory
process is reduced, a check is eliminated and the risk of substantive
of Article 9, 80 VA. L REV. 1783, 1807 (1994) (explaining the influence of financial institu-
tions on the revision to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code), for the reasons discussed
above, they had little leverage in the negotiations over the shape of the Crime Control Act.
123. While this example only applies to efforts to exclude the regulated industry from deliber-
ations, concern about enhancement of the principalfagent problem as a result of reduced partici-
pation applies equally to weakening the committee structume, by enacting term limits. Indeed,
there may be additional concerns. It is also likely that inexperienced legislators will be forced to
rely on more experienced professional committee staff, and the lobbyists themselves for guidance




error is increased. it is therefore more likely that statutes will be en-
acted that are in nobody's best interest, and it is also more likely that
these statutes will not work properly.
III. CONCLUSION
What can be done to remedy the problem of iron triangles? The
destabilizing solutions discussed above create their own set of problems
and may do more harm than good. There is substantial literature on
whether judicial review" and statutory interpretation'25 can provide
a solution to the problem of regulatory capture. An evaluation of this
literature is beyond the scope of this article. Indeed, the jury is still out
over whether any of these approaches are justified or workable. 2 6
More importantly, judicial review is at best a corrective; it does not fix
the process which created the problematic legislation in the first place.
If the destabilizing proposals discussed here are not a solution, and
if judicial review is a second best solution, the only practical response,
short of abandoning the regulatory enterprise entirely, may have to be
twofold: Madisonian and pluralist on the one hand; and, for lack of a
better term, Burkean'27 on the other.
On the Madisonian/Pluralist side, if there is to be any hope for
regulation and legislation in the public interest, it is necessary for legis-
lators and regulators to recognize the risks associated with legislating in
124. Richard Epstein advocates searching judicial review under the Takings and Contract
Clauses of the Constitution in order to curb rent seeking. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS
(1985). See also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTTUTION 265-303
(1980) (proposing heightened judicial review of regulations). Cass Sunstein has argued that
heightened constitutional scrutiny should be applied to legislation which effectuates transfers to
powerful political groups. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV., 29, 69-72 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984).
125. Eskridge, supra note 69, at 303-309 (statutes should be narrowly construed when the
benefits axe received by a concentrated, well organized group, and the costs are borne by a
diffuse, disorganized group, and vice versa); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 223,
230-31 (1986) (statutes should be construed in light of their public regarding purpose in order
to limit the effect of capture); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 471 (1989) (advocating narrow construction of statutes which represent
interest group transfers).
126. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 YALE LJ. 31 (1991).
127. In Burke's view, legislators should act in the public interest, rather than according to the
interests of their constituents. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in 2 THE
WORKS OF EDMUND BuRKE 89, 95-97 (3d ed. 1869).
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the wake of the collapse of an iron triangle and to seek to ensure that
all affected groups are active participants in the legislative and regulato-
ry process. Recent experiments at the agency level with regulatory
negotiation may be on the right track, with their effort to reduce the
cost and increase the effectiveness of early participation in the
rulemaking process." Similar efforts might be made by House and
Senate subcommittees as well.
Perhaps the most important lesson of interest group theory, howev-
er, is that it is impossible to rely on the interplay of interest groups to
identify the public interest, particularly when a previously stable regu-
latory scheme has collapsed. The political process cannot, by itself, do
the work of the legislator, or for that matter, the legislature. The second
response is thus Burkean: one must put procedure and interest group
theory to the side and focus on substance. Legislators and regulators
must recognize that there is a danger in consensus, whether it is as a
result of an iron triangle or of a collapsed iron triangle. It can breed
bad drafting. Where there is no opposition, and therefore no discussion,
there is a greater likelihood that the governing coalition may err. Such
errors may be costly. Disorganized groups who are harmed by a statute
may later organize and express their anger at the polls (thereby achiev-
ing a solution, although delayed, and at considerable institutional cost).
Therefore, even purely self-interested legislators who wish to ensure
128. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994) establishes proce-
dures under which an agency, prior to beginning a rulemaking proceeding under the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, can conduct a regulatory negotiation, or "reg neg." The agency identifies
representatives of the interests who are likely to be affected by a proposed rule and invites
them to participate in a negotiation over the final shape of the regulation. This process has
certain advantages. By identifying affected groups and bringing them into the process early, th
cost of participation may be reduced, and the effectiveness of participation may be increased.
There are risks associated with regulatory negotiation as well. For example, it must be recog-
nized by the regulators that agreement and consensus are not necessarily the goals of regulation.
If consensus is sought rather than regulation in the public interest, then regulatory negotiation
may become yet another way of facilitating capture. However, to the extent that it is used to
increase the number of affected groups whose views are considered, and to reduce the costs of
that participation, regulatory negotiation may be a useful innovation. See OFFICE OF M'E VICE
PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REMW IMPROVD:G
REGULATORY SYSTEMS 29-33 (1993). For a critical discussion of regulatory negotiations, see
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation,
43 DUKE U. 1206 (1994) (noting the limitations of regulatory negotiations and proposing struc-
tural incentive-based reform). For contrasting perspectives on regulatory negotiation, compare
Henry H. Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking and Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN. L REV. 471
(1986) (emphasizing the positive features of regulatory negotiation) with William Funk. /hen
Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest--EPA's Woodstove
Standards, 18 ENVTL. L 55 (1987) (offering an example of regulatory negotiation run amok).
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that their votes are only traceable to good (or popular) outcomes must
recognize the risks associated with legislating in the wake of a col-
lapsed iron triangle. They must make particular efforts to seek partici-
pation by affected groups, and they must pay closer attention to the
substance of the legislation. Only then will the quality of regulation
improve.
